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Abstract 
This paper explores the viability of microenterprise credit programs funded by the 
Inter-American Development Banlc It provides a conceptual framework that emphasizes 
the importance of financial management and of quality of services for the success of the 
program and institutional survival. It evaluates four programs, in Paraguay, Colombia, 
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, from the perspective of this conceptual framework. 
Lessons learned include the need for adequate information systems that focus on institution-
al viability, rather than on beneficiary impacts; the need for the organization to be con-
cerned about self-sufficiency and growth; the strengths of a minimalist approach; the 
importance of positive real interest rates; and the strong need for portfolio diversification. 
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ON THE VIABILITY OF MICROENTERPRISE CREDIT PROGRAMS: 
FOUR CASE STUDIES1 
by 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Rodrigo A. Chaves2 
I. Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increasing interest among governments, interna-
tional agencies, a growing number of private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and profes-
sionals concerned with economic development, regarding the demand for credit and for 
other financial services by small and microenterprises, both in the urban and the rural areas 
of the developing nations. Thb growing intere~t has been reflected in numerou~ programs 
and proposals to increase the flow of credit for microenterprises, as well as by the design 
of specific mechanisms aimed at increasing the access of small entrepreneurs to sources of 
funding for their productive activities. These targeted efforts and many of the approaches 
designed to implement them are reminiscent of the interest in the "credit needs" of the small 
farmers that permeated many donor activities in the 1960s and 1970s. 
1 This paper was prepared for the Office of External Review and Evaluation (ORE) of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as background material for the Study of the 
IDB's Experience with Microenterprise Credit Programs, under the direction of Alicia 
Pfund. The authors are solely responsible for the views expressed here. These views may 
or may not be shared by the sponsoring institution. 
2 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at 
the Ohio State University. Previously, he was Dean of the Faculty of Economic Sciences 
at the University of Costa Rica. Rodrigo A. Chaves, a citizen of Costa Rica as well, is a 
doctoral research associate at The Ohio State University. The authors acknowledge com-
ments by Alicia Pfund and Peter Natiello. 
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The unsatisfactory performance of many of the small fanner credit programs of the 
past few decades has been extensively documented? The lessons learned from those ex-
periences should serve, for that reason alone, as a guide for the design and implementation 
of the new microenterprise credit programs, frequently based upon similar assumptions. In 
a few instances, those experiences have actually influenced the organization of the new pro-
grams and, when this has been the case, the prospects for success have substantially in-
creased. When the same mistakes of the past have been repeated, on the other hand, a 
similarly generalized failure may be expected. The criteria for the evaluation of microenter-
prise credit programs used in this paper is, to a large extent, derived from the lessons as-
sociated with the performance of the small farmer credit programs of the past.4 
As in earlier decades, most programs have been designed on the generalized assump-
tion that the lack of access to credit is one of the most binding constraints faced by a micro-
entrepreneur. Although this may be the case in many instances, access to credit is not a 
cure for all of the small enterprise problems. Moreover, many programs that have disbursed 
"loans" may hardly be considered genuine credit activities. In many instances, there has 
hardly been any evaluation of the borrowers' capacity to pay the loans. There has been 
little concern with creditworthiness, in general, although the determination of who is credit-
worthy and who is not is one of the most important dimensions of a credit activity. 
3 See, for these purposes, Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J. D. Von Pischke, 
eds. Undermining Rural Develgpment with Cheap Credit, Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1984. 
4 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, ''Bl Financiamiento de la Pequefia Empresa," in Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega and Tomas Miller-Sanabria, eds. FinwciiWlit:nto y Apoyo a la Migoempre-
g, San Jose, Costa Rica: Academia de Centroamerica, 1990. 
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Only in a few instances have there been vigorous efforts to collect the loans, although 
the recuperation of the loan portfolio is essential to guarantee the permanency of the pro-
gram. A permanent program is required, in turn, to offer valuable and reliable services to 
the microenterprise clientele. Otherwise, the program will not be valuable to the microen-
trepreneurs. A single, once-in-a-lifetime loan does not solve any small firm's problems. 
If, in addition, the interest rates charged on the loans do not reflect the opportunity 
cost of the funds as well as the costs of the intermediary, then one has a "transfer" activity 
rather than a "credit" program. The incentives and attitudes that surround transfers are very 
different from those required for the successful performance of a credit activity. Among 
other things, transfer and welfare programs require continuous infusions of new money and, 
as a result, their permanency and viability is entirely dependent upon the willingness of the 
external sources to continue funding the program. The outcome is a weak organization. 
Most of these programs are not only inadequate as credit tools, therefore, but in ad-
dition they do not offer deposit facilities and other financial services to the microentrepre-
neur. There is a substantial demand among small enterprises, however, for safe, convenient, 
and reasonably rewarded deposit facilities. Access to such services should be provided, di-
rectly by the organization, or otherwise be sponsored by it.5 Emphasis on credit supplies 
only, most likely subsidized loans, has pushed many organizations for the promotion of mi-
croenterprises beyond their institutional capabilities. Important questions about the role of 
5 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Marco Teorico y Experiencias en el Financiamiento de 
la Pequefia Empresa," in Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Tomas Miller-Sanabria, eds. Financia-
miento y Apoyo a la Microempresa, cit. 
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credit and about institutional design must be resolved, therefore, for the successful imple-
mentation of a microenterprise credit program. 
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II. Conceptual Framework: Institutional Viability 
The main ingredient for the success of a microenterprise credit program is its institu-
tional viability. Only a viable program can promise permanent and reliable services to its 
clientele and can thereby grow in order to reach larger numbers of small enterprises. 
Experience has shown that the final borrowers benefit more when the program is sustain-
able. The four case studies reported here confirm this hypothesis. 
A viable institution is self-sustaining and valued by its clientele. This requires an 
agency that is able to cover its costs, that provides high quality services, that reaches an 
increasing number of customers, that is dynamic in offering new services and products, and 
that actively searches for ways of improving its efficiency, as reflected by the level and the 
degree of dispersion of the transaction costs incurred by its clients and by the intermediary 
itself. Viable institutions possess credibility and are usually able to mobilize deposits from 
their beneficiaries and funds from other local sources, they collect their loans, and retain 
good management and staff.6 
To improve their viability, microenterprise credit programs must be able to increase 
the flow of their loanable funds, in real terms. The lending capacity of these programs be-
comes sustainable when they protect their portfolios from inflation, vigorously collect their 
loans, in order to be able to grant new credit, aggressively mobilize local resources, in order 
to widen the range of their services, and impose low transaction costs on their clientele. 
6 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "On the Viability of Agricultural Development Banks: 
Conceptual Framework," paper prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank (ORE), 
1990. 
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When they lack viability, the survival of the microenterprise credit programs is ques-
tioned by their clientele. Increasing levels of loan default become the evidence of this loss 
of support. Loan delinquency is a signal that the borrowers are not interested in the sur-
vival of the institution. Since they do not expect the program to be able to provide a per-
manent service, the value of their relationship with the organization is low, and they do not 
take care to protect it with the timely service of their loan obligations. 
When the microenterprise credit programs do not mobilize voluntary deposits from 
the local community, the programs' opportunities to grow on the basis of locally mobilized 
resources are diminished. A greater reliance on deposit mobilization has been critical for 
many financial intermediaries at a time when severe fiscal constraints have reduced the 
ability of governments to capitalize these institutions with budgetary transfers, when the 
targets of macroeconomic stabilization programs have eliminated access to rediscounting, 
and when the international debt crisis has reduced access to foreign savings. Deposit mo-
bilization, on the other hand, is not an easy task and many microenterprise credit programs 
may want to address this issue by sponsoring the mobilization of client savings by developing 
links with already established intermediaries. 
Viable microenterprise credit programs do not become instruments for political pa-
tronage. High levels of political intrusion and the biasing of their objectives away from 
efficient financial intermediation destroy them. In order to survive, these programs must 
emphasize their role as financial intermediaries. They must operate under the assumption 
that the efficient provision of financial services per ~ is an important contribution to the 
development of the microenterprise sector. 
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The traditional small farmer credit programs of the past were characterized by bor-
rower domination. All practices and operational procedures were designed with the interest 
of the borrowers in mind; not for the sake of depositors or of the implementing institutions. 
Thus, the rapid disbursement of the funds was favored. Target clientele were chosen in-
dependently of their repayment capacity or without any guarantee of recuperation of the 
funds. Credit was subsidized. The results were disastrous. 
To be viable, microenterprise credit programs must behave as if they were depositor-
dominated institutions. In this case, the practices and procedures utilized would seek to 
protect the program's loanable funds. In this case, the borrowers' repayment capacity would 
be taken more seriously. In this case, the procedures for and efforts towards loan collection 
would be emphasized more than the quick disbursement of the funds. In this case, portfolio 
diversification would be used as a tool to manage risk, instead of concentrating all the loans 
in a few narrow activity types. 
Borrower-dominated institutions have been characterized by the absence of a clear 
concept of risk in their operations. They have attempted, instead, to channel funds to target 
clientele, for specific purposes, rather than evaluating the borrower's repayment capacity and 
the degree of risk taken in each case. Within a depositor-dominated intermediary, on the 
other hand, a careful management of risk is the most important component of the organiza-
tion's culture. Microenterprise credit programs, if they can not easily mobilize deposits, 
must in any case behave as if they were depositor-dominated institutions. 
Many microenterprise credit programs have mistrusted the market and have mini-
mized the role of interest rates as a major tool for resource allocation. These programs 
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have preferred, instead, the administrative determination of who to lend to and what to lend 
for. Because of their dependency on external funds, these decisions have been, in turn, 
frequently imposed from outside. They have insisted on rigidly targeting credit and on a 
detailed supervision of the use of the funds, as well. These efforts, despite their good 
intentions, have frequently resulted in unexpected negative consequences. Fungibility has 
frequently frustrated attempts to control the end uses of the loan funds and transaction costs 
have become too high, for the program as well as for the borrowers. 
What is needed, therefore, are viable institutions, capable of offering a wide range 
of financial services, to a growing clientele, independently of the end use of the funds. If 
the interest rates charged are not subsidized, the borrowers will devote the funds to priority 
uses. They know better than anyone else how to efficiently use those funds. If the loans 
are expensive, they will certainly economize them. 
The main responsibility of a microenterprise credit program is to keep the integrity 
of its loanable funds. The program keeps those funds in custody, in the name of donors and 
depositors (including international agencies) that entrusted those funds, so they could, in 
turn, facilitate the rnicroenterprise productive activities. If the program does not protect 
these resources, it breaks its agreement with the suppliers of the funds, who expect to 
recuperate them. If this purchasing power is not protected, the intermediary will find it 
impossible to offer loan services to its borrowers, when these need its support. 
To keep the integrity of its loanable funds, the program must avoid their erosion by 
inflation. This will only be possible if the rates of interest charged are positive in real 
terms; that is, if they are higher than the inflation rate. The institution's interest rate 
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policies must respond, therefore, to expected inflation rates. An intermediary that charges 
only 50 percent of nominal interest on its loans, with an inflation rate of 100 percent per 
year, will experience, on this account only, a reduction of the purchasing power of its port-
folio to two-fifths, in only three years. Thus, it will be in a position to offer the same credit 
service to only 40 percent of its original clientele. If it tried to service all of these clients, 
it could offer no more than 40 percent of the purchasing power originally transferred. One 
way or another, the quality of the service would have deteriorated and the institution would 
lose the support of its clients. 
Inflation forces financial institutions to revise their procedures. Accounting practices 
must be modified, in order to reflect the real value of assets and liabilities and to avoid de-
capitalization. The greater variability of prices that usually accompanies an inflationary 
process, frequently coupled with selective price controls, makes the evaluation of lending 
risks even more difficult. Portfolio management practices have to be revised. 
In order to keep the integrity of its loanable funds, the institution must also collect 
its loans. An intermediary that each year loses 20 percent of its portfolio because of default 
will be decapitalized the same way as with an equivalent rate of inflation. Moreover, de-
linquency generates a negative demonstration effect. If others do not pay, and get away with 
it, why should I pay? 
In order to keep the integrity of its loanable funds, an institution must avoid opera-
tional losses as well. This implies both a reduction of operating costs, avoiding waste and 
inefficiency, as well as sufficient revenues. Effectively earned interest is the main source of 
revenues for a financial intermediary. The rate of interest charged on the loans must cover 
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expected inflation and the institution's operating costs, while at the same time it makes it 
possible to build sufficient reserves against default losses. To achieve this balance is not an 
easy task. The problem is further complicated when the program has to assume the ex-
change rate risk on foreign loans and the rates of devaluation and of inflation differ a lot. 
A microenterprise credit program will be viable to the extent to which it offers high-
quality services. An entrepreneur is interested not only in sufficient purchasing power from 
the loan; he also wants the funds to be timely disbursed, the loan procedure to be easy and 
flexible, the amortization schedule to adequately correspond to his cash flow, and the loan 
term to be sufficiently long. All of this determines the quality of service. 
It is not always easy to establish creditworthiness. For this purpose what is most 
important is for the lender to acquire enough information about the borrower, in order to 
be able to estimate the probability of lack of repayment. This information is accumulated 
through experience and a continued relationship with a particular client. Once his reputa-
tion as a good borrower has been established, the client protects it, since it is a valuable 
intangible asset. This asset is more valuable if the credit program is permanent rather than 
transitory. The viability of the program depends upon this perception. 
The borrower also expects the program to be reliable; the expected losses from lack 
of access to credit when this is needed, such as during an emergency, can be high. Untimely 
service may also cause additional costs for the producer. The more complete the service, 
such as in a "financial supermarket," the greater the convenience and the less the cost for 
the client. There are many advantages for the client from both holding his deposits and 
conducting his credit transactions at the same institution. The client's first interest, there-
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fore, is a solid and viable institution with which to develop a long-term financial relation-
ship. This is, indeed, the nature of his implicit contract with the informal moneylender. 
Microenterprise credit programs have much to learn from informal lenders. 
The viability of a microenterprise credit program is strengthened if it offers low-cost 
services. This does not mean that interest rates must be kept at artificially low levels. What 
is the value of too low an interest rate, if the loans are disbursed several months later, when 
they are not needed any longer, or if the institution does not authorize the expenditures that 
the producer wants? What is the value of an artificially low interest rate, if it decapitalizes 
the organization to the point that it has to drastically reduce the amounts that it can lend? 
What is the value of subsidized credit, if the client can get it this month but not the next? 
It becomes necessary to recognize that, in order to be able to offer high quality 
services, microenterprise credit programs need adequate operation margins. It is necessary 
to recognize, as well, that poor quality services impose additional costs on the client, that 
make credit even more expensive. Delayed loans reduce the profitability of his productive 
activities. Cumbersome procedures waste his time and effort. What seems cheap turns out 
to be expensive. 
The provision of financial services is never cheap. What matters, for the microentre-
preneur's production and investment decisions, is the total cost of the funds. Interest rates 
are only a portion of these costs, frequently not the most important. There are other impli-
cit costs, such as the opportunity cost of the time spent in the transaction or the losses due 
to delays in the disbursement of the funds. There are legal expenses, commissions, ac-
counting statements, feasibility studies, taxes, travel costs, and bribes. When these other 
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costs are high, loans are expensive. These costs beyond interest payments tend to be par-
ticularly high in the case of small credit transactions. 
What matters for the credit program is a financial margin that covers the costs of 
funds mobilization and the costs and risks of lending and that leaves a profit that allows for 
growth. A program that is not profitable, stagnates, and if it makes losses, it shrinks and 
it disappears. Intermediation margins would need to be excessively wide, however, when 
there is not a vigorous loan collection, since this forces the financial institution to accumu-
late reserves in order to avoid decapitalization. In addition to a greater operational ef-
ficiency, in order to reduce the cost of credit, a reduction of delinquency is thus necessary. 
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III. The IDB Microenterprise Programs 
The viability offour implementing agencies for microenterprise credit programs spon-
sored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is explored in this paper, in order 
to determine the importance of several factors that may influence the programs' ability (or 
lack of it) to offer permanent and reliable services to their clientele and in order to obtain 
lessons of general interest from these specific experiences. The four programs studied are 
associated with: 
(a) the Fundacion Paraguaya de Cooperacion y Desarrollo (FUPACODEf; 
(b) the Fundacion Santo Domingo, in Colombia, previously known as Fundacion Ba-
rranquilla; 
(c) the Fondo Mixto para el Fomento Industrial de Michoacan (FOMICH), Mexico8, 
and 
(d) the Asociacion para el Desarrollo, Inc. (APEDI) in the Dominican Republic.9 
All of these microenterprise programs received loans from the IDB during the 1980s. 
For the purposes of this paper, fragmentary and unconfirmed information was obtained from 
documents and several other sources available at the IDB (ORE). These data were ori-
ginally prepared for various other purposes and did not necessarily conveyed the information 
that was required for a proper institutional and financial evaluation. Although this is, there-
7 Paraguayan Foundation for Cooperation and Development. 
8 Mixed Fund for Industrial Promotion in Michoacan. 
9 Development Association. 
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fore, the most important limitation of the present study, interesting observations and a few 
generalizations have been possible. 
On the basis of the partial and limited information available, several lessons were 
learned about the probabilities of success and institutional viability of microenterprise credit 
programs in Latin America. These lessons, reinforced by evidence available from similar 
programs, are summarized below. Brief descriptions of the outcome of the evaluation of 
each program are provided in the following chapters. 
3.1 Data on the Intermediaries 
It appears that the IDB has made significant efforts to have the implementing insti-
tutions create data sets about their individual borrowers. Loan agreements have required 
the executing agencies to keep detailed information and to regularly report on the borrow-
ers' performance and characteristics. This is both expensive and possibly unnecessary to 
evaluate the impact of the program. Heterogeneous small borrower characteristics in a 
dynamic environment are difficult to measure and to accurately record. The evolution of 
the small enterprise is subject to too many influences for this method to be cost effective. 
Sample surveys may be sufficient for these purposes. 
The generalized absence of adequate information on the performance of the imple-
menting agencies has been, on the other hand, surprising, given the importance of good data 
for institutional viability and the success of the programs. Most of the reports required by 
the IDB about the implementing agency itself essentially deal with the progress of loan 
disbursements. This emphasis on disbursements has characterized most subsidized, borrow-
er-dominated donor programs not sufficiently interested in viability. It has reflected a 
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failure to use data as a management tool. It is important for the IDB, however, to establish 
a uniform system of reports about the performance of the implementing agencies, in order 
to monitor the financial and operational performance of these intermediaries. 
At a minimum, guidelines should be established about the certification of financial 
statements by auditing firms and about acceptable measures of delinquency.10 The fol-
lowing are examples of adjustments that may be necessary: 
(i) Financial statements are usually presented on an accrued rather than on a cash 
basis. Although this standard procedure captures important elements of an intermediary's 
performance, it is important, however, to incorporate information about the actual cash 
realizations of some of the accounts. This is particularly important in the case of the 
income statement, because interest payments represent the main source of revenues for the 
program. Accrued interest payments are usually greater than actually received interest 
payments. Thus, an income statement on an accrued basis overestimates the organization's 
viability when loan delinquency is present and actual interest revenues are less than shown 
in the statement. 
To have information about actual interest and amortization payments received pro-
vi des an early signal and a better measurement of portfolio delinquency. This is so because 
the amount of money that should have been received can be contrasted with the actual pay-
ments. That is, one can observe the ratio of actual payments with respect to amounts due. 
10 The financial statements of the four programs, although correct from an auditing 
perspective, were prepared following different methodologies (e.g., cash versus 
accrued), contained different sets of data, and were deficient in reporting delinquen-
cy. 
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The indicator of delinquency used by the IDE-sponsored programs, on the other hand, is 
the ratio of installments in arrears divided by the total credit portfolio. This is insufficient 
in order to determine the extent of repayment problems in the program. First, the IDB 
indicator underestimates delinquency problems during the initial stages of the credit pro-
grams, when corrective measures are precisely more important, because as borrowers be-
come delinquent, in those earlier stages their overdue payments are a small fraction of the 
total growing portfolio. 
Second, measuring delinquency as the ratio of overdue payments with respect to the 
total portfolio ignores other manifestations of repayment problems, such as the rescheduling 
of overdue loans, repayments after a period of arrears, or the importance of loans under 
legal collection. More detailed and accurate data on repayment are extremely important. 
(ii) In those cases where the microenterprise programs combine credit and other 
components, such as training, reporting methods should accurately assign each activity their 
operational income and costs. This represents the only way in which a meaningful efficiency 
analysis can be performed. Implementing organizations and donor agencies should be able 
to quantify operational results, in order to establish the viability of each individual compo-
nent of the program, so as to know the exact opportunity cost of their non-financial activities 
and the magnitude of the cross subsidization involved. 
3.2 Objectives of the Organization 
The analysis of the four case studies indicates that a microenterprise credit organiza-
tion is more likely to succeed if it presents the following characteristics: 
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(i) The organization shows a strong desire for self-sufficiency and growth, reflected 
by its recognition of the value of money and of the risks associated with credit operations. 
This recognition results in sound financial policies, which have as their objective the sustain-
ability of the organization, as opposed to channelling subsidies during a short period of time 
to a low number of microentrepreneurs. 
(ii) The organization is completely specialized in the provision of credit services 
(minimalist approach). This should be contrasted with other organizations that attempt to 
serve different types of beneficiaries with many services for each type. 
It seems that more flexible and specialized organizations are better vehicles for credit 
programs. This is because management is more focused on detecting eventual problems and 
in determining relevant changes that need to be made. Such organizations are able to react 
in a much quicker fashion to changes in their environment and to new opportunities for 
growth. That ability to react with agility is a vital component in the success of a financial 
intermediary, particularly in an inflationary and unstable macroeconomic environment, such 
as in most Latin American economies during the 1980s. 
3.3 Inflation and Interest Rate Policies 
The implementing agencies must be allowed maximum flexibility in the determination 
of their interest rate and other pricing policies. This has not always been the case with the 
!DB-funded programs, however. Frequently, the interest rates to be charged have been 
fixed by the terms of the loan agreement, leaving no room for timely adjustments, even in 
countries with high inflation rates. When this has been the case, the implementing or-
ganizations have become decapitalized and unable to fulfill their purposes. 
18 
There is no reason for the implicit fears that, left to themselves, the microenterprise 
credit programs will charge exhorbitant interest rates. Rather, they will have to be encour-
aged to charge sufficiently high rates and to make frequent revisions of those rates a regular 
practice of their financial management decisions. As in any other economic activity, a high 
sensitivity to price signals is a precondition for success. 
Similarly, there is no merit in the generalized practice of rigidly assigning components 
of the interest rate spread for specific purposes. Although minimum allocations for certain 
purposes must be encouraged, the determination of the appropriate margins and of their 
optimum allocation are also typical managerial decisions. 
3.4 Portfqlio diversification 
Diversification is one of the cornerstones of a successful credit program. This is 
particularly important when dealing with a clientele such as microentrepreneurs, who have 
a fragile source of income. A problem that might represent a flu for one established firm, 
could be a deadly pneumonia for a microentrepreneur. Project design should avoid, there-
fore, concentrating loans on homogenous borrowers and should allow the implementing in-
termediaries to diversify their portfolios. If one single event, short of a tragedy or natural 
disaster, can significantly reduce all of the borrowers' ability to pay, then diversification of 
the portfolio had not been achieved. This might be one of the causes of FOMICH's high 
delinquency rates, given the decrease in tourism to Michoacan and the failure of the hand-
dicraft marketing agent LACASA. Diversification is particularly important when lending 
to microenterprises because of the fragility of these businesses. 
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3.5 Viability and exchange rate risk 
In the four case studies, the IDB assumed the foreign exchange rate risk on the loans 
to the implementing agencies. This was a critical and positive decision for the viability of 
these organizations. Had they assumed this risk, the resulting losses would have eventually 
caused their financial collapse. For example, the eventual losses would have amounted to 
381.9 million pesos, up to December, 1990 in the case of Fundacion Barranquilla. In the 
case of APED!, these potential losses, amounting to 7.6 million pesos, would have caused 
the organization's insolvency. At the current exchange rates, APEDI's debt with the IDB 
would represent 2.5 times the institution's assets and 16.5 times its equity. 
Most Latin American countries have experienced significant exchange rate instability 
during recent years. Clearly, exchange rate losses would have been incurred if the 
implementing organizations would have been asked to keep liabilities denominated in a 
foreign currency, while their financial assets were all denominated in domestic currency and 
when the interest rates charged to the final beneficiaries do not include a premium for this 
risk. 
The presence of a foreign exchange rate risk is a difficult issue in microenterprise 
credit programs. The key question is: which one of the parties involved in the program 
should bear those risks? Such parties include the donor agency funding the program (IDB), 
the governments of the countries where the programs are carried out, the implementing 
organizations (and sometimes a financial intermediary, as well), and the final beneficiaries 
of the programs. 
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Donor agencies will experience reductions in their capital if they assume the ex-
change rate risk. This reduces their ability to support other programs in the future. Some 
governments have assumed the exchange rate risk associated with similar programs through 
their central banks. Such a procedure has generated operational losses for the central banks 
that, as part of their deficits, have increased inflationary pressures. When the losses are 
large, the resulting instability may more than offset the intended benefits of the programs. 
In addition, when governments treat those potential foreign exchange losses as direct 
transfers to particular groups, rent-seeking and political patronage and intrusion are likely 
to negatively affect the viability of the programs. 
To hedge against these risks, the implementing organizations may transfer the risk 
to their borrowers, through some sort of indexed credit contract, so that interest and 
amortization payments increase as the local currency is devalued with respect to the 
currency in which the organization's liabilities are denominated. The consequence of this is 
that only borrowers with activities whose returns are highly responsive to exchange rate 
variations would successfully pay back their loans. Microenterprise activities, unfortunately, 
tend to be highly concentrated in the production of non-tradable goods and services. The 
resulting interest rates may become too high, therefore, during periods of exchange rate 
instability. If rates of devaluation are higher than the domestic inflation rate, when the 
other components of a sound interest rate are added, the resulting cost of borrowing from 
the organization may become too high and may even lead to severe adverse selection prob-
lems. That is, only borrowers who do not intend to pay or those with extremely risky 
projects will demand credit from the organization at those interest rates. 
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The absence of foreign exchange rate risk or its adequate management is a vital 
ingredient in the success of a microenterprise credit program. Unfortunately, there is no 
panacea in this case. The !DB's decision to assume this risk protected the institutions' 
viability in these four cases. An obvious recommendation, however, is that credit programs 
should have as much local funding as possible, in order to minimize these problems. This 
objective can only be achieved if the organization mobilizes domestic resources in the form 
of savings accounts or if it acts as a retailer of wholesale funds borrowed from local banks, 
denominated in domestic currency. FUPACODE in Paraguay is a good example of the 
latter strategy. 
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IV. 
Paraguay 
Fundaci6n Paraguaya de Cooperaci6n y Desarrollo: FUPACODE 
A. The Organization 
Fundaci6n Paraguaya de Cooperaci6n y Desarrollo (FUPACODE) was established 
in February, 1985 as a non-profit organization. Its objective has been to promote the social 
and economic wellbeing of the microentrepreneurial community of Paraguay. 
B. The IDB-FUPACODE Program 
In July, 1987 the IDB granted FUPACODE a loan for Sw.Frc.780,750 (equivalent at 
the time to US$500,000), funded by the Small Projects Program. The purpose of the loan 
was to assist the Foundation in providing credit to low-income Paraguayan microentrepre-
neurs. The IDB donated FUPACODE a Sw.Frc.140,535 (US$90,000) grant, in order to 
improve its training programs for microentrepreneurs and to strengthen the Foundation's 
operational capability. 
The conditions of the IDB loan to FUPACODE were the following: 
(1) Amount: Sw.Frc.780,750, equivalent to US$500,000 at that time. 
(2) Currency of Repayment: FUPACODE's debt is denominated in Paraguayan 
Guaranies. As a result, the IDB assumed the foreign exchange rate risk associated 
with the loan. 
(3) Terms of Repayment: The term of the loan is 40 years. FUPACODE is expect-
ed to cancel the loan through 60 equal bi-annual amortizations, starting after a ten-
and-a-half years grace period. 
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( 4) Financial Cost: The IDB charges a 1 percent annual commission fee to FUP A-
CODE on the outstanding balances of the loan. There are no other interest charges 
on the loan. 
Originally, FUPACODE agreed to use the IDB loan funds to provide credit to micro-
entrepreneurs, under the following conditions: 
(1) Term Structure: The term for repayment available to the microentrepreneurs 
was originally based on the declared purpose of the loan. Working capital loans 
were assigned from 3 to 12 months, while fixed capital investment loans were allowed 
a repayment period of up to 24 months. 
(2) Amounts of Credit: The amounts of credit available for each borrower have 
been between US$200 and US$3,000 (equivalences in Guaranies). 
(3) Amortization: Loans are to be paid with monthly amortizations. 
( 4) Interest Rate: It was agreed that the interest rate charged on loans to microen-
trepreneurs would be based on the following criteria: 
(a) the interest rates prevailing in the country for similar borrowers; 
(b) the !DB's guidelines about similar credit programs; and 
(c) the domestic inflation rate in Paraguay. 
At the beginning of the program in 1987, the interest rate charged to the 
beneficiaries was set at 35 percent per year on the outstanding balances. Since then, 
FUPACODE has made significant interest rate adjustments. 
FUPACODE agreed to use the spread between the interest rate it charges to its 
borrowers and the one percent com.rnision fee charged by the IDB as follows: 
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(a) one-half of the spread to finance the program's operational costs; 
(b) five percent of the portfolio to create a reserve for bad loans; and 
(c) the remaining revenue from interest payments to increase the amount of 
funds available for credit. 
An interesting aspect of the implementation of this program was that, prior to the 
first disbursement of the funds, the IDB sent a team of five experts to review and help 
improve FUPACODE's organizational capability. The team's efforts focussed on financial 
planning, training programs for microentrepreneurs, credit allocation, and accounting 
systems. 
Finally, the program design required FUP A CODE to hire the services of a financial 
intermediary, in order to disburse and collect the loans granted with the IDB funds, but this 
never took place. 
C. FUP ACODE's Relationships with other Donor Agencies and Banking Institutions 
One important characteristic of FUPACODE's development have been its intense 
relationships with several international donor agencies. Besides the loan and grant from the 
IDB. in the period between February, 1985 and December, 1989 FUPACODE received 
US$1,602,489 in grants from the following agencies: 
(a) the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
(b) the Interamerican Foundation (IAF), 
(c) the United States Peace Corps, 
(d) the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 
(e) the United Nations Development Progfam (UNDP), and 
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(f) Accion International. 
These grants have directly supported FUPACODE's operational expenses and have 
increased its lending capability to service microentrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, by December, 1989 FUPACODE had received 204.3 million 
Guaranies (US$371,363) in loans from five banks operating in Paraguay. The weighted 
average interest rate on those loans was 23.7 percent per year. In addition to such actual 
disbursements, FUPACODE had 400 million Guaranies (US$727,272) of approved credit 
Lines with two of those banks. The weighted average interest rate on those operations was 
21 percent per year. Most of the loans were extended with a guarantee offered by a New 
York bank. This bank had, in turn, USAID's fiduciary guarantee. That is, USAID acted 
as guarantor before the New York bank and the latter acted as guarantor before the local 
bank. The Agency paid for the financial charges of the operation. 
It is interesting to point out that these private bank loans were received by 
FUPACODE while a good portion of the IDB loan was not yet fully disbursed, despite the 
fact that the financial cost of these transactions has been considerably higher than for the 
IDB loan. 
Contrary to the case of some of the other institutions under study, the IDB's assis-
tance to FUP A CODE has been relatively small, when compared to the total contribution 
of other agencies. In effect, the IDB's US$90,000 grant for operational support represented 
only 5.2 percent of the total assistance received by FUP A CODE for that purpose up to 
1989. The amounts of the loan disbursed by the IDB up to that date represented 37 percent 
26 
of the Foundation's total loan portfolio. This program has thus successfully practiced 
diversification of its liabilities as a mechanism to protect its viability. 
D. Institutional 'Evolution 
FUPACODE has experienced impressive rates of growth since its creation in 1985. 
Moreover, its evolution has not only been characterized by such rapid quantitative growth, 
but also by an equally impressive ability to adapt and undertake organizational and method-
ological adjustments when necessary. 
1. Financial Evolution 
FUP ACODE's growth has been substantial. Tables 1 and 2 show the behavior of the 
Foundation's balance sheet since it was created. As shown, FUPACODE increased its total 
assets from 17.5 million in 1985 to 533.7 million Guaranies four years later, by the end of 
1989. This 30-fold multiplication of its size in nominal values corresponds to rapid real 
growth as well. In Guaranies of constant 1985 purchasing power, the size of the organiza-
tion increased from 17.4 million to 222.6 million. This growth represented an increase of 
12.7 times in four years. On the other hand, in real terms, the Foundation's equity grew 
from 15.5 million to 99.4 million of constant 1985 Guaranies. This represented an increase 
of 6.4 times during the same four-year period. 
The real growth of assets and equity has been a consequence of several factors. With 
respect to equity, it has basically resulted from the grants received for the credit fund and, 
to a lesser extent, from savings made by the organization on operational grants, due to its 
increasingly high levels of self-sufficiency. On the other hand, the growth of assets has been 
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due both to the growth of equity and to PUP A CODE's increased leverage levels. It is 
evident that FUP A CODE has been very successful in securing numerous and diverse sources 
of assistance, thereby decreasing its dependency on one single institution or donor. 
Table 1: PUP A CODE: Comparative Balance Sheet for Selected Years 
(thousands of Guaranies) 
Assets: 
Short term 
Permanent/long term 
Total Assets 
Liabilities: 
Short term 
Long term 
Total Liabilities: 
Equity: 
1985 1986 
4,491 23,764 
12,998 65,306 
17,490 90,757 
n.a. n.a. 
n.a. n.a. 
1,956 16,927 
15,534 73,829 
1987 1988 1989 
136,664 247,268 518,927 
18,820 24,515 34,724 
155,484 271,784 533,659 
57,938 122,994 202,712 
35,209 103,843 
57,938 158,195 306,555 
97,545 113,588 247,096 
Tables 2 and 3 show that, over time, FUPACODE's balance sheet has begun to look 
more like the accounts of a financial intermediary, which it is, and less like those of a 
charitable organization, with only equity and no liabilities. The reason has been that its 
liabilities have become increasingly important as a proportion of its total assets. The same 
trend has been reflected by FUPACODE's income statements. This trend has both 
reflected and reinforced desires for self-sufficiency. 
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Table 2: FUPACODE: Evolution of TQtal Assets and Eg,ui~ in Real Terms 
(Thousands of constant 1985 Guaranies) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Total Assets 17,490 68,912 96,875 137,969 222,618 
Equity 15,534 56,058 36,098 57,658 99,355 
It is clear that FUPACODE has been increasingly resorting to debt instruments in 
order to finance its credit operations. The leverage indicators presented in Table 3 show, 
however, that FUP A CODE has still a long way to go before it exhausts its borrowing capa-
city. Given FUPACODE's on-going relationships with local banks, its strong equity base 
and interest rate policies, it seems that the organization should be able to sustain these high 
rates of growth for a long time. 
Table 3: FUPACODE: Leverage Indicators 
(Percentages) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
Liabilities/ equity 12 23 59 139 
Equity /assets 88 81 63 42 
Debt's contribution 12 19 37 58 
to total assets 
1989 
124 
44 
56 
The increased size of the organization has already spilled over to its beneficiaries, 
in terms of the number of loans extended and of the amounts of credit available. This is 
shown in Table 4. FUP A CODE multiplied its real loan balances 99 times from December, 
1985 to March, 1990. The average annual rate of growth of its real loan portfolio was 52 
percent during that period. The number of credit operations disbursed every year increased 
dramatically, as well. In 1989, FUPACODE extended 2,592 loans to its beneficiaries, 4.3 
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times more than in 1986. These 2,592 operations in 1989 represented an average of 10 
loans per working day. 
Table 4: FUPACODE: Loan Portfolio Balances and Number of Operations 
(Thousands of Guaranies) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199oU 
Nominal Loan 2,198 51,810 103,992 138,886 276,958 594,375 
Portfolio Balance 
Real Loan Portfolio 2,198 39,339 64,792 70,145 119,224 200,667 
Balan celL 
Real Portfolio Change n.a. 1,689 64.7 8.3 69.3 68.3 
(Percentages) 
Annual Number of n.a. 603 1,607 2,071 2,592 4,00ol2L 
Disbursed Loans 
u In 1985 constant Guaranies. 
u Refers to March, 1990. 
!2L Estimated by ORE. 
2. Efficiency and Sustainability 
The growth of the organization has been accompanied by an increase in its adminis-
trative staff. The number of full-time employees in FUP ACODE's payroll increased from 
13 in 1987, to 30 in 1988, and 44 in 1989. The average increase in personnel during the 
period has been less than the average increase in operational activity. It seems, therefore, 
that FUPACODE's activity growth has been matched with increased efficiency, as econo-
mies of scale have been reaped. This topic will be further pursued below, where computer-
ization and credit approval systems are analyzed. 
The growth in loan portfolio and apparent increase in efficiency have implied that 
FUPACODE's level of self-sufficiency has improved with time. This is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: FUPACODE: Self-Sufficiency Indicators 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Ratio of Operational 
Revenues to Expenses 
(Percentages) 0.10 16.8 54.4 87.0 85.4 
Real Operational 
Revenues1L 8.5 5,881 38,260 65,528 75,541 
Real Operational 
ExpensesU 7,221 34,913 70,347 72,725 88,423 
1L Thousands of constant Guaranies of 1985. 
U Includes bad loan write-offs. 
Operational revenues include income from interest payments on loans, training 
services, and administrative charges to borrowers. Operational expenses are based on what 
the auditing firm Coopers and Lybrand considers to be expenses directly related to those 
income-generating services. It should be noted, however, that operational expenses might 
be overestimated, due to the fact that FUP A CODE received significant grants to cover the 
operational expenses of programs funded by international agencies. It would appear that 
those programs were cross-subsidizing each other since, for example, in 1989 the total 
amount received for that purpose was 248.5 million Guaranies and the combined total 
expenses were only 213.6 million. This implies that FUPACODE saved 34.9 million 
Guaranies when carrying out those programs with their own separate budgets. It is impossi-
ble to quantify the amount of subsidization from those programs to FUP ACODE's regular 
operations. This would require an extensive on-site analysis of its operations, in order to 
precisely appraise the expenses for each one of FUPACODE's activities. 
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On the other hand, the accounting methods used by the organization record interest 
income as it is accrued, instead of when it is actually received. This could certainly overesti-
mate interest income and, thereby, operational revenues, if delinquency is significant. 
However, delinquency does not appear to be a serious problem in FUP ACODE's case. 
Arrears represented about 10 percent of the portfolio in 1987 and 1988. In 1988 and 1989, 
FUP A CODE wrote-off from its loan portfolio 6 million and 6.6 million Guaranies, respec-
tively. This operational expenditure represented 4.3 and 1.1 percent of the total loan 
portfolio for those years. 
Writing-off loans, regardless of the age of the arrears problem, is a fairly uncommon 
accounting policy for this type of organization. In FUPACODE's case, it seems to be a very 
good signal about the willingness of the organization to report an accurate picture of its 
financial situation. Such delinquency rates and loan write-offs do not pose a threat to the 
financial health of the institution. This is because, as of December, 1989 the Foundation 
had already created a reserve for bad loans of 12 million Guaranies. Note that such a 
reserve was created in addition to writing-off bad loans. Even more importantly, still 
considerably higher levels of delinquency would not immediately harm FUPACODE's 
financial situation. This is because FUPACODE's interest rate and pricing policies are 
aimed at protecting its balance sheet and to achieve not only self-sufficiency, but growth in 
real terms. 
3. Services 
FUP ACODE•s scope of services is limited to training and credit for microentrepre-
neurs. The educational component is very simple and consists only of one class taught by 
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a member of the staff the same day the loans are disbursed. Loans are for small amounts, 
sometimes as low as the equivalent of US$40. Very few loans are above US$2,000. Most 
loans are repaid by weekly installments and have a relative short duration (from 2 to 4 
months). In almost all cases loans are given to groups of borrowers, including married 
couples. Each member of the group acts as a consigner, guarantor for the other members' 
obligation. 
From the first contact with the microentrepreneur, the disbursement of the first loan 
takes from 2 to 3 weeks. Thereafter, additional loans depend on the punctuality of pay-
ments of the current loan. Increasing amounts of credit are extended after the complete 
repayment of past loans. Credit approval decisions are made by a staff member who 
manages a portion of the portfolio and who has pecuniary incentives, based on loan 
delinquency, to evaluate creditworthiness. The credit allocation system seems to be very 
expeditious and cost effective. Note that in the original design of the IDB project, loans 
were supposed to be approved by a five-member credit committee. That design required, 
in addition, the traditional paperwork for credit applications. These favorable procedure 
changes undertaken on FUPACODE's initiative were fortunately approved by the IDB. 
4. Pricing Policies 
FUP ACODE's pricing policies do not make any distinction between credit and 
training services. Actually, all of its operating revenues come from interest payments. The 
total cost of borrowing from FUPACODE in 1989 was determined as follows: 
(a) a 3 percent monthly flat payment on the principal amount as interest; and 
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(b) a 3 percent monthly flat payment on the principal amount as charges for training 
and follow-up services. 
Training charges have been thus calculated on the basis on the amount of the loan 
and not on the actual training services received by the borrowers. They represent, therefore, 
another interest payment, rather than a fee for training. The IDB program borrowers have 
been charged 3 percent interest per month on outstanding balances, instead of the 3 percent 
flat rate. 
It is clear that the Foundation's pricing structure is essentially equivalent to a 6 
percent monthly flat interest charge. This 6 percent flat rate is, in turn, considerably higher 
than the equivalent rate resulting from payments based on the outstanding balance of the 
loan. In short, FUPACODE has been charging an effective interest rate of more than 72 
percent per year. Indeed, the organization received a return of 74.7 percent on its average 
portfolio in 1989. This suggests that delinquency has been very low. 
Given an annual inflation rate of 28.7 percent for 1989 in Paraguay, FUPACODE's 
72 percent charges were equivalent to a real interest rate of more than 33.6 percent per 
year. Those rates are still considerably lower than the rates Alicia Pfund found were being 
paid by microentrepreneurs to moneylenders. In the sample, such rate were on the average 
218.4 percent per year. This explains the high demand for loans faced by the Foundation. 
One consequence of this policy is that FUP A CODE is protecting itself against 
inflation. Thus, FUP ACODE's self-sufficiency, sustainability, and real growth problems are 
reduced to the adequacy of its intermediation spread and the size of its portfolio. Since the 
rate of delinquency is relatively low and the operational costs reported by FUP A CODE 
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seem reasonable, the organization should be able to attain complete self-sufficiency and real 
growth by simply increasing its credit portfolio. This would be true even if FUPACODE 
had to borrow all of the additional funds at rates similar to those it was paying in 1989 to 
the domestic commercial banks. This assumes that the organization would be able to al-
locate this additional credit at similar rates and risk levels, which is a reasonable pres-
sumption. 
FUP ACODE's most imminent threat resides in attempting to maintain the programs 
whose budgets are covered by international donors after those agreements expire. It should 
be noted that in 1989, the organization received 248 million Guaranies as grants for such 
purposes. 
5. Organizational Evolution 
FUP ACODE appears to be a very dynamic organization, that in a period of just four 
years (1985-1989) made important adjustments and improvements in its organization. The 
following are some noticeable examples of its flexibility and ability to improve: 
(a) FUPACODE kept changing its credit approval and disbursement procedures, 
until it achieved what appears to be a highly expeditious and cost-efficient system; 
(b) in 1989, FUP A CODE initiated a process to expand its geographical scope, when 
it opened three new branches in that year; 
(c) in 1989 the Foundation completed the process of computerizing its organizational 
activities; and 
(d) FUPACODE has established very sophisticated and modern techniques for 
training and evaluating its personnel. 
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E. Lessons Learned and IDB Project's Impact 
There are several important lessons to be learned from the apparent high success 
experienced by FUPACODE. 
(1) The organization has shown a strong desire for self-sufficiency and growth, 
reflected by its recognition of the real value of money and the risk associated with 
credit operations. This has resulted in sound financial policies that have had as their 
objective the sustainability of the organization, as opposed to channelling subsidies 
during a short period of time to a low number of microentrepreneurs. 
(2) The organization is completely specialized in its credit services. This should be 
contrasted with other organizations that attempt to serve very different types of 
beneficiaries, with many services for each type. 
(3) FUPACODE has been very successful in rallying several donor agencies in its 
favor, which has decreased its dependency on just one of them. This seems to have 
allowed the organization to approach problems in its own way, without having to 
conform to one single donor's view. FUPACODE has managed to develop a set of 
policies and procedures of its own despite links to many donors. 
( 4) Much of the assistance received by FUP A CODE has had as its objective to 
increase its local borrowing capability. This has been achieved by granting an initial 
amount of capital (leverage base) and then helping the organization to borrow from 
local intermediaries, with the donor agency acting as a guarantor. As a result, 
FUPACODE has established financial relations with several local banks. 
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It is easy to expect that as a consequence of FUPACODE's success, those banks 
would lend in the future without requiring such guarantee. The intermediation from 
traditional commercial banks to microentrepreneurs is feasible only because FUP A-
CODE has been able to borrow at rates consistent with traditional banking opera-
tions and to lend at rates consistent with the nature of the microentrepreneurs' 
activities (i.e., at high real interest rates). Once donor agency programs expire, 
FUPACODE could borrow as wholesaler and lend as retailer, achieving financial 
independence from international donors. In fact, such mechanism could be, from the 
intermediaries' perspective, a relatively close substitute to savings mobilization. 
Unfortunately, that does not solve the problem of lack of access to deposit services 
for the microentrepreneurs. 
(5) The absence of foreign exchange rate risk has been fundamental for the organiza-
tion's performance. Had FUP A CODE been exposed to such risks, it would probably 
be insolvent by now. 
(6) FUPACODE shows a highly decentralized and flexible administrative structure. 
(7) The Board of Directors seems to be highly involved in the organization. In 1989, 
they assumed personal responsibility as guarantors (cosigners) for a US$30,000 loan 
received by FUPACODE. 
(8) Most donors (including the IDB) did not expect the organization financial spreads 
to cover particular 11Charitable., programs. Those programs were provided for with 
independent budgets. 
37 
Finally, it is apparent that the IDB program had a positive impact given items (4), 
(5), and (8) above. In particular, it was interesting how the IDE provided technical assis-
tance before disbursing the first loan. More importantly, it seems that the IDB allowed, 
after the design of the project, FUP A CODE to set its own pricing policies and conditions 
on loans. This flexibility on the part of the IDB saved FUP ACODE's viability. 
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v. 
Colombia 
Fundaci6n Santo Domin2o 
(Previously Known as Fundaci6n Barranguilla) 
A. The Organization: 
Fundaci6n Barranquilla (FQA) was established as a non-profit organization in April, 
1960 by the city's business leaders. Its objective has been to increase the welfare of 
Barranquilla's population, by creating and supporting educational, cultural, and charitable 
organizations. FQA did not have any experience as a financial intermediary until 1982. In 
that year, it began a program to support local microentrepreneurs with a very small credit 
component. 
B. The IDB-FQA Program: 
In 1984, the IDB granted a loan to FQA for Sw.Frc.l,064,500 (equivalent at the time 
of US$500,000). The loan was funded by IDB's Small Projects Program and its purpose was 
to assist FQA to implement a training, technical assistance, and credit project to benefit 
Barranquilla's microentrepreneurial community. The specific purpose of the loan was to 
finance the project's credit component. 
The following are the conditions of the IDB loan to FQA: 
(1) Amount: Sw.Frc.1,064,500, which at the time of approval of the operation were 
equivalent to US$500,000. 
(2) Currency of disbursement: Swiss Francs. 
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(3) Repayment Currency: The payments from FQA to IDB should be made in 
Colombian Pesos. The IDB assumed the foreign exchange rate risk. 
( 4) Term of Repayment: The term of the loan is 20 years after the agreement was 
signed (June, 1984). FQA is expected to cancel the loan with 20 equal bi-annual 
amortizations beginning in December, 1994. 
(5) Financial Cost: The IDB charges a one percent annual commission fee to FQA 
on the outstanding balances of the loan. 
FQA used the IDB loan to create a credit fund for microentrepreneurs. The 
following are the general condition under which FQA has extended these loans: 
(1) Interest Rate: 23 percent per year. 
(2) Term of Repayment: 50 percent of the credit operations at 12 months and the 
remaining 50 percent at 36 months. 
Credit recuperations should be used to extend further credit to the program's benefi-
ciaries. Finally, FQA agreed to use the 23 percent annual interest income generated by the 
IDB loan as follows: 
(a) the IDB's commission 1 percent 
(b) the financial intermediary's commission 
(c) operational expenses of the credit program 
(d) loan write-offs 
(e) credit program growth 
Total interest income 
3 percent 
12 percent 
2 percent 
5 percent 
23 percent 
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The 3 percent corresponding to the financial intermediary's commission refers to 
payments from FQA to a local intermediary, hired to disburse and collect loans. FQA still 
promotes, supervises, and analyzes credit applications. 
Credit operations represent only one of the dimensions of this program. Besides 
credit services, the program has a strong component of training for microentrepreneurs. On 
the other hand, the credit process itself requires a great deal of effort on FQA's part, 
because its staff have to elaborate investment plans and a financial analysis for each loan. 
C. Financial Impact on FOA 
1. The Effects of Inflation: 
The IDB-FQA agreement forces the foundation to extend credit to microentrepre-
neurs at a rate of interest of 23 percent per year, while the agreement states the expected 
uses of the income generated by the program. Project design thus allocated, for annual 
operational expenses and growth of credit portfolio, the amounts shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Fundacion Barranquilla: Margin Allocations 
Proportion of Loan Amount 
Item 
Operational 
Expenses 
Growth of Credit 
Portfolio 
Portfolio (Colombian Pesos) 
12% 10.4 million 
5% 4.36 million 
Table 2 shows the annual rates of inflation experienced by the Colombian economy 
since the beginning of the IDB program. They imply that in August, 1990 it was necessary 
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to spend 4.25 pesos to purchase goods and services that in June, 1984 had a price of one 
pesos. 
Table 2: Columbia: Variations in Consumer Prices (CPl. June 1984:100) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990* 
Annual CPI 109.2 133.5 172.2 213.5 273.7 350.4 425.9 
Rate of Change 18.3 22.3 29.0 24.0 28.2 28.0 32.3 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, February, 1991. 
* As of August, 1990. 
Under the most optimistic assumptions, the originally estimated 5 percent annual rate 
of nominal growth for the credit portfolio would have implied an accumulated growth of 
36.6 percent during the same period. That would have caused the credit portfolio to grow 
to 119.1 million pesos. Even if that would have happened, which is doubtful, inflation would 
have reduced this amount to 38 million of constant 1984 pesos. In short, even under 
otherwise optimal conditions, the purchasing power of the IDB loan would have been 
eroded by inflation to almost one third of its initial amount. Unfortunately, the credit 
portfolio did not grow at the estimated rates and, as a result, the contraction of the portfolio 
has been even more dramatic than suggested by these estimates. 
The average size of the loans extended by FQA has increased significantly, in 
nominal terms, as shown in Table 3. The average size of a loan granted in the first semester 
of 1988 (573,933 pesos) was 2.7 times greater than loans disbursed in the second semester 
of 1984. As a result, the real size remained more or less constant. This clearly implies, 
however, that as inflation took place, fewer microentrepreneurs had access to the IDB credit 
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program, since the real value of the total portfolio declined and the average loan size 
tended to increase. 
Table 3: Fundacion Barranquilla: Average Amount of Credit Granted. 
1984-1988 
(Colombian Pesos) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
196,024 215,095 246,875 371,900 513,933 
The IDB-FQA loan agreement assigned 10.4 million pesos per year to cover the 
program's operational expenses. This amount corresponds to 12 percent of FQA's credit 
portfolio. Those operational expenses result from payments to resources such as personnel 
and other services. The price of these resources tends to adjust rather quickly to changes 
in price levels. The problem is that, while operational expenses increase with inflation, the 
revenue budgeted to cover them remains fairly constant. For instance, if FQA devoted the 
10.4 million pesos exclusively to the payroll of the 18 people who work in the program, the 
corresponding average salary would be US$84 per month, at the 1990 exchange rate. One 
would expect that actual salaries are much higher. In fact, the corresponding average at the 
beginning of the program was US$697. In any case, payroll represents only a portion, 
although important, of total operational expenditures. 
Again, it seems that FQA has to subsidize the program, because the amounts of 
revenue budgeted in the IDE agreement (and thus generated by the program) seem not to 
' 
cover the current level of expenses. This means that the program is simply not self-sustain-
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ing and, as a consequence, that it represents a source of operational losses to FQA. Clearly, 
this will reduce the intermediary's ability to provide services in the future. In many cases, 
such financial stress causes some intermediaries simply to disappear or to cut back in their 
services, as a consequence of a viability crisis resulting from excessive operational losses. 
In FQA, this danger has been magnified, due to the credit approval system adopted 
according to the original design of the program. The following is a brief description of the 
process required to produce a single loan: 
(1) FQA's employees identify and make contact with microentrepreneurs in Barran-
quilla. At that moment, a technical assistance process starts, during which a system 
of accounts is set up and, in general, the borrowing ability of the business is verified. 
This is a step prior to the elaboration of the actual investment project. 
(2) If the investment project is judged viable by the FQA employee, then he and the 
beneficiary prepare the credit application. According to the rules established, the 
application should include, among other things, financial statements, investment plan, 
and a cash flow for the project. It is clear that, given the nature of FQA's clientele, 
its employees must devote a good deal of effort to each loan application. 
(3) The loan application is reviewed by a committee of representatives of FQA, the 
Chamber of Commerce, and the financial intermediary. This means that people from 
three different organizations must get together in order to approve one loan. 
( 4) After disbursement, each operation should be supervised and technical assistance 
should be provided. 
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Evidently, this system represents a very expensive mechanism to allocate credit. 
According to the design of the project, these activities should have been financed during 20 
years with an annual budget equivalent to 12 percent of a relatively fixed amount of nominal 
credit. 
3. Delinquency 
One worrisome signal about FQA's sustainability is the evolution of delinquency in 
its credit portfolio. Table 4 shows an steady tendency of delinquency to increase. In fact, 
the decrease shown from June, 1987 to December of the same year resulted from loan 
write-offs for 1.7 million pesos. It seems that the assumptions made in the IDB loan agree-
ment were not realistic, because an annual amount of only two percent of the loan portfolio 
was assigned to cover for delinquency losses. 
Table 4: Fundacion Barranquilla: Evolution of Delinquency in the IDB Program 
DEC DEC DEC JUNE DEC JUNE DEC 
84 85 86 87 87 88 89 
Loans in Arrears (%) 1.8 5.4 6.2 7.7 5.1 5.2 12.4 
Loans in Arrears and 
Legal Collection 1.8 8.0 10.2 12.4 8.4 9.1 n.a. 
Loan write-offs 
('000 Col$) 0 0 105.7 n.a. 1711.8 (75) 4,698 
Loans in Legal 
Collection 
('000 Col$) 0 804.0 2320 3087 2672 3408 n.a. 
Note: Loans in arrears are measured as the proportion that due and non-collected 
amortizations represent of the total portfolio. Other delinquency indicators 
were not available. 
45 
Table 4 shows that, up to December, 1989 FQA had written-off loans for 4.7 million 
pesos, which does not represent in itself an alarming amount. However, the tendency of the 
variables presented in this table seems to indicate that the delinquency problem might 
increase in the future. The reasons for this are: 
(a) The measure of loan arrears presented underestimates the problem, because 
it shows only the amount that should have been received at certain point in time. 
Experience with similar programs elsewhere tells that delayed payments for one 
operation evidence credit risk for the total amount of the loan. This is particularly 
important when loans have a relatively long term. 
(b) Both loan write-offs and loans under legal collection show a tendency to in-
crease. In microenterprise lending it is usually hard to collect loans through the legal 
system. This is because microentrepreneurs can easily hide their income. In FQA, 
an important proportion of its loan portfolio is not guaranteed with traditional 
collateral. 
(c) In general, microentrepreneurs show more willingness to pay their loans when 
they have expectations of a constant and stable business relationship with the 
intermediary. Since FQA's real credit portfolio has shrunk significantly, some 
microentrepreneurs must be rationed out. If current borrowers are rationed out from 
loan renewals or from new operations or even if they are informed of such situation 
by others, they would lose an important incentive to pay their loans back. 
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3. The Use of a Financial Intermediary 
The IDB program design included the hiring by FQA of a specialized financial 
intermediary, in order to perform the activities of loan disbursement and collection. The 
agreed payment for those services was set at an annual three percent of FQA's credit 
portfolio. 
A priori this mechanism seems to be an interesting innovation because: 
(a) Borrowers get the impression that they are dealing with a traditional financial 
intermediary, which would go to any extent to collect loans. This might reduce the 
ex ante expected level of delinquency. 
(b) One should expect that a specialized and experienced organization can perform 
those tasks at a lower cost than a non-financial organization, such as FQA was before 
the IDB loan. If that is the case, it might be more attractive to pay for the services, 
instead of creating the necessary organizational structure to perform them. 
Despite these apparent advantages, it seems that something did not work well in this 
particular case. This is because, in theory, loan collection was to be completely performed 
by the specialized intermediary. However, FQA does operate a collection department, 
which has, among others, the following functions: 
(a) send due payment notices, 
(b) keep information on overdue payments, 
(c) perform delinquency analysis for individual operations, and 
(d) recommend rescheduling, legal collection, or write-offs. 
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These are indeed the most important loan collection activities. It seems, then, that 
the financial intermediary only receives payments and issues receipts; it is merely a cashier. 
These are, on the other hand, low marginal cost operations. Clearly, there exists a duplica-
tion of functions between the intermediary and FQA, which turns out to be expensive, 
because FQA still pays three percent per year on its outstanding loans for a much reduced 
service. 
It should be noted that, in general, the cost of loan collection for an established 
intermediary is much less than three percent per year of its loan portfolio. In fact, in 
markets with relatively high levels of competition, such as Colombia, that percentage is close 
to the spreads between cost of capital and return on assets enjoyed by banks and other 
established intermediaries. 
The question that arises, therefore, is: What is the reason for such duplication of 
functions? The following are some elements that might contribute to a possible answer: 
(1) Microenterprise loans are small. An intermediary faces equal cost of collecting 
a loan for one peso or for one million pesos. Therefore, managing a credit portfolio 
made up of small operations is expensive. 
(2) In an inflationary environment, if liabilities and the credit portfolio increase in 
nominal terms as prices rise, a fixed percentage of these magnitudes, such as three 
percent, tends to represent a relatively stable amount in real terms. FQA's credit 
portfolio has remained relatively constant in nominal terms, however, at about 87 
million pesos, which implies that a three percent per year of this amount represents 
a decreasing value in real terms. 
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(3) It seems that the contract between FQA and the financial intermediary does not 
provide with risk-sharing mechanisms. That is, all credit risk seems to be assumed 
by FQA. It is clear that, in a contract lacking such provisions, there are incentives 
to reduce the amount of effort on the part of the intermediary (moral hazard). 
Given (1) and (2) it might be that the intermediary finds it unattractive to perform 
these loan collection activities. In fact, the intermediary could be expected to eventually stop 
providing the services, unless its remuneration is adjusted. Therefore, it might be the case 
that the duplication represents FQA's reaction to increased delinquency, due to the moral 
hazard behavior on the intermediary's part; or that it resulted from a renegotiation between 
the two parts. The latter case would mean an effective increase of the intermediary's 
payment by reducing its operational load, in order to compensate for inflation. 
The lessons that must be learned from this duplication can be summarized as: 
(a) In FQA's case, collection activities seem to be extremely expensive, because of 
the double cost (commission and operational expenses) it is incurring. This has 
negative consequences on the organization's viability. 
(b) Underline, once again, the damaging effects that inflation, fixed nominal portfo-
lios, and rigid interest rates policies have on organizations providing financial 
services. 
4. The IDB Program's Impact 
Table 7 provides the summarized information available from the FQA's consolidated 
income statement. 
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Table 7: Fundacion Barranquilla: Income Statement 
Total Income ('000 Col$) 
Total Expenses ('000 Col$) 
Profit or Loss ('000 Col$) 
1987 1982 
60,086 
83.363 
(23,277) 
12,577 
5.188 
7,389 
If FQA maintains its current 23 percent per year interest rate and keeps providing 
the same services to its borrowers, operational losses will increase. This might cause a 
viability crisis in the short term. The higher the inflation rate, the sooner such crisis should 
be expected. 
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VI. 
Mexico 
Fondo Mixto para el Fomento Industrial de Micboacan 
<FOMICH) 
A. The Orianizations: 
The program involves the following organizations: 
(1) the Nacional Financiera SNC (NAFIN): This is a financial agency of the Mexi-
can Federal Government. 
(2) the Fondo Mixto para el Fomento Industrial de Michoacan (FOMICH): This is 
an agency of the State Government of Michoacan, created in 1976. Its purpose has 
been to promote the development of Michoacan's industrial sector. Before the IDB 
program, FOMICH's main activities were infrastructure construction and direct risk-
capital investment in emerging industrial firms. 
(3) La Casa de las Artesanias (LACASA): This is another state entity, created in 
1970, in order to organize the artisans and to preserve and develop the state's 
handicraft industry with technical assistance, marketing, and organization services. 
NAFIN's role in the project has been to act as an intermediary between the IDB and 
FOMICH, the implementing agency. FOMICH performs all of the program's financial 
operations. LACASA,. on the other hand, is supposed to act as a link between FOMICH 
and the beneficiaries of the project. Project design expected LACASA to select borrowers, 
help them fill credit applications, and provide them with technical assistance. 
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B. The IDB-FOMICH Project 
In 1985, the IDB began disbursing a loan to FOMICH, using NAFIN as the interme-
diary, with the purpose of funding a credit and technical assistance program to benefit 
artisans living in the rural areas of the State of Michoacan. The following are the conditions 
under which FOMICH received the loan: 
(1) Amount: US$500,000, in domestic currency, at the prevailing exchange rate at 
the time of disbursement. 
(2) Terms of Repayment: The term of the loan is 25 years after the first disburse-
ment. FOMICH is expected to cancel the loan through 34 equal bi-annual amortiza-
tion payments starting after eight-and-a-half years. 
(3) Currency of Repayment: FOMICH's debt is denominated in Mexican Pesos. 
The IDB assumed the foreign exchange rate risk associated to the loan. 
( 4) Financial Cost: FOMICH's annual financial cost is 1.25 percent on the outstand-
ing balances of the loan. The cost corresponds to annual commission fees paid to 
the IDB (1 percent) and to NAFIN (0.25 percent). 
FOMICH agreed to use the IDB loan to provide credit only to Michoacan's artisans 
under the following conditions: 
(1) Interest Rate: The interest rate was fixed at 29 percent per year, 
(2) Term Structure: FOMICH was supposed to allocate 60 percent of the loans at 
15 months and 40 percent at 60 months terms. 
FOMICH has been using the annual spread between the interest rates it charges to 
its borrowers and its financial cost as follows: 
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(a) Eleven percentage points to cover technical assistance and operational expenses, 
(b) five percent to create a reserve for bad loans, 
(c) two percent to cover collection expenses, and 
(d) the remaining spread to reinvest in the credit portfolio. 
It is not clear whether FOMICH has made any payments, corresponding to the 11 
percentage points for technical assistance and operational expenses, to LACASA. In the 
proposal for the IDB loan it was stated that LACASA would enjoy 6 percentage points as 
a compensation for technical assistance and credit allocation services. The audited financial 
statements for 1985 and 1986 do not record such payments. 
It is important to point out that the information available on this program presents 
important contradictions, in particular about delinquency rates and the use of the resources. 
Important differences were found between FOMICH's audited financial statements for 1986 
and the Project Completion Report (PCR) elaborated by the IDB field office in 1990. In 
some cases, such contradictions were sorted out for the present purposes. When we believe 
that the PCR contains erroneous information, both sets of data are presented. 
It is apparent that FOMICH is, in any case, under considerable financial and 
organizational stress. 
C. Financial Impact 
1. Credit Portfolio 
FOMICH began receiving loan disbursements from the IDB and NAFIN in April, 
1985. The loan was completely disbursed by May, 1988. Table 1 shows disbursements in 
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US dollars, as well as the amounts that were available in Mexican Pesos to allocate as loans 
to artisans. 
Table 1: FOMICH: Disbursements Received from the IDB Loan 
(thousands) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
TOTAL 
US$ 
183.8 
99.7 
165.4 
59.9 
500.0 
Average Exchange 
Rate 
273.1 
640.1 
1,496.0 
2.281.0 
956.2 
Mex$ 
50,234 
63,894 
247,440 
116.556 
478,126 
The original amounts generated by the program implied FOMICH's ability to allocate 
478.1 million pesos to credit. As indicated, in addition FOMICH was supposed to use 11 
percentage points of its portfolio in order to increase its credit fund. That is, under these 
optimistic assumptions, FOMICH's credit portfolio originating from the program would be 
663.2 million pesos. This amount represents an upper bound, because its calculation 
assumes that FOMICH experienced zero delinquency, that it allocated new loans immedi-
ately after collecting repayments, and that the amounts shown in Table 1 were available 
during the whole year. 
The purpose of this computation is to approximate the delinquency and inflation 
effects on a best-case scenario basis. This is necessary, because financial information is 
available up to 1987 only. Also, FOMICH's financial statements for 1987 reflected a loan 
portfolio balance of 296.1 million pesos as well as other investments with the program's 
54 
resources in instruments issued by NAFIN, for 173.6 million pesos. That is, as of December 
of 1987 the organization had not allocated all of the resources generated by the program 
to loans for artisans. The best-case senario analysis thus represents the only meaningful way 
to isolate the effects that delinquency and inflation may have had on FOMICH's ability to 
deliver real loan balances to artisans. 
2. Effects of Inflation 
The Mexican economy experienced a severe inflationary process in the 1984-90 
period. Table 2 presents the consumer prices indexes and inflation rates for those years. 
Between 1985 and 1990, the accumulated price increase was 1,382.5 percent. That is, prices 
multiplied 14.8 times during that period. It is obvious that such rates of inflation have 
considerably eroded the purchasing power of FOMICH's credit portfolio. 
Table 2: Mexico: Inflation Indicators (Consumer Prices) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Price Index 100.0 186.2 435.7 924.6 1109.3 1482.5 
Annual Rate of 
Price Variations 63.7 86.2 131.8 114.2 20 33.7 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, February, 1991. 
In order to approximate this effect, it is important to recognize that the disburse-
ments received by FOMICH took place over a four-year period (1985-1988) and that they 
were converted to their domestic currency equivalents at increasing exchange rates. These 
higher exchange rates somewhat compensated for the inflationary losses. 
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Table 3: Approximate Inflation Effects on FOMICH's Credit Portfolio 
Year of 1990 Price Index 1990 Real Inflation Nominal1990 
Disbursement Amount for year t = 100 Balances for Erosion Equivalent 
(t) Disbursed (Average) year t=lOO Coefficient Amount Disbursed 
1985 50,234 1,482.5 3.388 0.067 744,719 
1986 63,894 796.6 8,014 0.125 508,980 
1987 247,440 343.7 71,993 0.291 850,457 
1988 116,556 160.4 72,847 0.625 186,956 
Total 478,126 306.0 n.a. 0.349 2,291,106 
As indicated in Table 3, the 50.2 million pesos disbursed by the IDB in 1985, by 1990 
had a purchasing power equivalent to only 3.4 million pesos of 1985. In turn, the 63.9 
million pesos disbursed by the IDB in 1986 had, by 1990, a purchasing power equivalent to 
only 8 million of the former year. Therefore, the total amount disbursed by the IDB in 1986 
in 1990 could purchase only 12.5 percent of the goods and services it commanded in the 
year when it was originally disbursed, and so on. Thus, the total amounts disbursed by the 
IDB (478.1 million pesos), by 1990 could purchase only about one-third of the goods and 
services that they commanded in each one of the years when they were originally disbursed. 
Another way to view the effects that inflation has had on FOMICH's loan portfolio 
is to calculate the nominal amount that, in 1990 prices, would be equivalent to the disburse-
ments made by the IDB. Such compution is presented on the last column of Table 3. The 
result is 2,291.1 million pesos. That is, the 478.1 million pesos disbursed by the IDB should 
have grown to 2,291.1 million by 1990, in order to compensate for the price changes ocurred 
between the time of each disbursement and this past year. As already mentioned, the best-
case scenario, given project design, would imply a loan portfolio of 663.2 million pesos in 
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1990, which is just 29 percent of the 2,291.1 million that FOMICH should have had, in order 
to protect the real portfolio from erosion. It should be clear, in any case, that the annual 
nominal growth of 11 percent designed for portfolio growth in the program hardly compen-
sates for the damaging effects of annual inflation rates well above 100 percent, as shown in 
Table 2. 
Fortunately for FOMICH and Michoacan's artisans, the IDB did not disburse the 
totality of the loan in 1985. The delays in disbursement helped to partially keep their real 
values, by indexing undisbursed amounts to US dollars. Paradoxically, this is a case in which 
it was better for the organization not to allocate credit, in view of high inflation rates and 
of interest rates too low to protect the real value of the portfolio. 
On the other hand, FOMICH's rigid interest rate policy, given such an inflationary 
environment, had important consequences on its viability. According to FOMICH's audited 
financial statements, in 1985 the program's direct operational expenses were 9 million pesos, 
while in 1986 they rose to 18.9 million pesos. Such doubling of outlays was caused merely 
by the increase in salaries of the personnel working for the program. Other operational 
expenses were not accounted for, because they were included in the organization's general 
operating expense account. 
Clearly, a fixed percentage of a nominal amount declines in real terms as prices 
increase. It can not be expected that FOMICH, or any other organization for that matter, 
would be able to support, over a period of time, its operational expenses with revenues from 
a fixed nominal income, in this case eleven percent of the total portfolio, under such cir-
cumstances. 
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In 1985 and 1986, FOMICH received on a cash basis (in contrast to accrued) 509,000 
and 7 million pesos, respectively, as interest payments on its credit portfolio. The eleven 
percentage points allowance for operational expenses for those two years would be, there-
fore, 193,000 and 2.6 million pesos. This would imply that FOMICH's cash operational 
losses due to the program were 8.5 million in 1985, and 11.9 million pesos in 1986. Unfortu-
nately, such losses will only increase over time. 
The cash interest income reported for 1986 represents 12.7 percent of the average 
credit portfolio of the year. This is a strong signal of a potentially delinquent portfolio, 
because the interest rate charged on the loans was 29 percent. In addition, at the end of 
1986 FOMICH's balance sheet reflected a total loan portfolio of 75.2 million pesos, while 
the organization by that time had received 114.1 million pesos from the IDB. This requires 
a careful delinquency analysis. 
3. Delinquency 
The delinquency experienced by FOMICH on its credit portfolio has been rapidly 
increasing since the beginning of the program. Table 4 shows two sets of estimates for 
delinquency. One was included in the Project Completion Report elaborated by the IDB 
field office in 1990, while the other one was calculated for the present purposes. 
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Table 4: FOMICH: Evolution of Portfolio Delinquency 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990* 
IDB's Field 
Office n.a. 13.13 8.26 16.85 34.74 37.59 
This 
Report 7.41 23.60 38.24 
*As of May, 1990 
n.a. 51.95 60.24 
The difference in the two measures of delinquency resides in the fact that for the 
present report, the outstanding credit portfolio at each one of those dates is used as the 
denominator, while the PCR's uses the accumulated amount disbursed during the life of 
program. The numerator for the delinquency ratios is the same in both cases and it 
corresponds to loans in arrears. For instance, the delinquency calculated by the IDB's field 
office for May, 1990 requires FOMICH's loan portfolio to be 924.2 million pesos as of that 
date. It should be clear that such amount corresponds to total disbursements, since the 
upper bound for the portfolio was shown above to be 663.2 million pesos. 
In any case, the trend implied by both measures makes it clear that FOMICH's 
delinquency problem has been increasing over time. The PCR puts forward the following 
hypotheses to explain such a tendency: 
(1) People are not used to go to a far away office to pay; 
(2) a belief by borrowers that it is not necessary to pay back government loans; 
(3) health problems in the borowing households; and 
( 4) marketing problems. 
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Explanation (1) does not seem to be a plausible reason for the increase in loan 
arrears from 1989 to 1990. This is because in 1989, FOMICH started a new collection 
method that consists of sending the program's staff to the communities, once a month, in 
order to collect payments. The staff is now being paid a commission from the 12 percent 
arrears penalty paid by the artisans on each late payment. Even though health problems, 
on the other hand, may sometimes be a determinant of delinquency one should not, under 
normal circumstances, expect them to account for a significant proportion of total loan 
arrears. 
Most of the time, high delinquency rates are explained by either a generalized 
perception that loan contracts an not enforceable, or by a generalized downturn in the 
economic activity that represents the most important source of income for the borrowers. 
FOMICH's delinquency problems might be explained by one of these alternatives or by a 
combination of both. Thus, FOMICH's delinquency problems most likely have resulted 
from inappropriate intermediation policies and project design. 
A generalized perception that loan contracts are not enforceable should be removed 
right at the beginning of a credit program. This problem could grow sufficiently to cause 
organizations to become a collection agency, rather than a financial intermediary. The 
resulting organizational stress and cash flow shortages further compound the problem. On 
the other hand, as inflation erodes credit portfolios, not protected by realistic interest rates, 
and more borrowers get rationed out, the incentive not to pay back increases. 
If the organization does not react quickly to the first signs of delinquency, both 
effects interact, posing serious threats to the program's very existence. FOMICH seems to 
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be a case study for this. As related by Alicia Pfund, most of the time of its staff is devoted 
to credit collection efforts. 
Diversification is one of the cornerstones of a successful credit program. This is 
particularly important when dealing with a clientele such as microentrepreneurs, who have 
a fragile source of income. A problem that might represent a flu for one established firm, 
could be a deadly pneumonia for a microentrepreneur. In FOMICH's case, most of its 
borrowers heavily depend on tourism and/ or the marketing activities by LACASA. Unfortu-
nately, it appears that Michoacan experienced a deterioration of both determinants of 
success. Tourism declined and LACASA failed as a marketing agent. Without sales, loan 
repayment became difficult. The microenterpreneurs felt betrayed and the program lost 
credibility. In FOMICH's case, nevertheless, the main mistake might have been not to allow 
diversification via lending to other types of microentrepreneurs and not only to a narrow set 
of artisans. 
E. Lessons Learned 
Several important lessons can be learned from FOMICH's experience: 
(1) Interest rate policies, inflation, the high costs of administration of small loans, 
and high delinquency rates are all highly related. 
(2) Project design should avoid a concentration of loans in homogenous borrowers 
and should allow the implementing intermediaries to diversify their portfolios. If one 
single event, short of a tragedy or natural disaster, can significantly reduce all of the 
borrowers' ability to repay, then diversification of the portfolio has not been 
achieved. This may be one of the causes of FOMICH's high delinquency rates, given 
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the decrease in tourism to Michoacan and the failure of LACASA as a marketing 
agent. Diversification is particularly important when lending to microenterprises 
because of the fragility of these businesses. 
(3) Project design should consider intermediaries whose objectives and budgets do 
not depend on changes of political parties in office. Alicia Pfund argues that a 
significant part of the program's problems can be explained by changes in LACASA's 
budget, personnel, and objectives resulting from a change in the State Government. 
On the other hand, FOMICH's Board of Directors is completely made up by high-
ranking officers in the State Government. This means that the institution is exposed 
to sudden changes of programs and objectives. 
( 4) Before the !DB's program, FOMICH was basically a construction and investment 
promotion entity, with very diverse activities. FOMICH's activities varied from road 
construction to direct capital investment in new companies. In 1986, two years after 
the beginning of the program, credit to artisans represented only five percent of the 
organization's assets. 
It seems that more flexible and specialized organizations can be better vehicles for 
credit programs. This is because management is more focused on detecting eventual 
problems and determining relevant changes to be made. Such organizations are able to 
react in a much quicker fashion. That ability to react with agility is a key determinant of 
the success of a financial intermediary, particularly in an inflationary and unstable environ-
ment, such as in most Latin American economies during the 1980s. 
A The Or~anizations: 
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VII. 
Dominican Republic 
Asociaci6n para el Desarrollo, Inc. 
<APED I) 
APED! is a non-profit organization created in 1962. It operates the following three 
programs: 
(1) the Centro de Investigaci6n y Mejoramiento de la Producci6n Animal (CIMPA): 
This is basically an animal husbandry program established in 1974 and devoted to the 
dissemination of new techniques. 
(2) the Vivero Urbano Forestal: This program was established in 1987 and its 
objective is to contribute to the reforestation of the Dominican Republic. 
(3) the Programa de Apoyo ala Microempresa (PRO APE): The program was estab-
lished in 1981; its activities basically consist of training and technical assistance to 
small businesses and microenterprises. 
(4) the Fondo para el Desarrollo, Inc. (FONDESA): Created in 1982 as the lending 
arm of APED!, its target clientele are small businesses and microenterprises. It is 
supposed to work in coordination with PROAPE. 
The liabilities resulting from the IDB loan are recorded on FONDESA's financial 
statements. The following analysis will focus, therefore, on that organization. 
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B. The IDB-APEDI Project: 
IDB made loans to APED I in 1983 and 1985, for a total of US$500,000, which are 
now fully disbursed. The conditions for both loans are basically the same. The only 
difference is that the 1985 loan has a longer term for repayment. The following is a 
summary of those conditions: 
(1) Amount: The equivalent of US$500,000 in Swiss Francs. The first disburse-
ment corresponded to SwFrc.476,000 (at the time, US$225,000). The 1985 loan 
corresponded to SwFrc.600,000. Therefore, the US$500,000 corresponded to SwFrc. 
3,076,000. 
(2) Term for Repayment: APED I will cancel the 1983 loan by 40 equal bi-annual 
amortization payments, starting after a ten-and-a-half years grace period from the 
loan disbursement. The term is 30 years. The 1985 loan should be cancelled by 60 
equal bi-annual amortization payments starting on July of 1996. The term is 40 
years. 
(3) Financial Cost: The IDB charges a one percent annual commission fee on the 
outstanding balances of the loan. 
( 4) Currency of Repayment: Amortization and annual commission payments are 
made in Dominican Pesos. The IDB assumed the foreign exchange rate risk associat-
ed to the loan. 
According to the IDB-APEDI agreement, the loan was to be used to create a 
revolving credit fund to extend loans to Dominican microentrepreneurs. Originally, the 
interest to be charged to the borrowers by FONDESA was 12 percent per year. These 
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conditions have changed, however, and currently the direct financial cost of borrowing from 
FONDESA is the following: 
(1) Interest rate: 30 percent per year on outstanding balances. 
(2) Disbursement Commission~ 5 percent of the loan. This is deducted from the 
amount disbursed. 
(3) Commission for PROAPE: 2 percent of the loan deducted from the disburse-
ment. This commission is supposed to compensate PROAPE for the elaboration of 
the credit application and for technical assistance for the borrower. 
( 4) Closing Commission: 2 percent of the loan deducted from the disbursement. 
This corresponds to legalization expenses. 
This implies that the nominal financial cost for a 12-month loan is 39 percent per 
year. The effective interest rate is significantly higher, because of the amounts deducted up-
front from the amount disbursed. In July of 1988, APED I asked the IDB for permission to 
increase the nominal interest rate charged on the loan. The IDB granted its authorization 
for the increase on August 4 of that year. 
C. The Impact of the IDB Program on the Organization 
According to FONDESA, the IDB program represented 46 percent of FONDESA's 
credit portfolio for 1989. The !DB's contribution to FONDESA is therefore significant, in 
terms of its volume of operations. Unfortunately, not enough financial information about 
the loan itself is available, so as to isolate the effect of the IDB program on the organiza-
tion, on aspects such as operational viability. This is because APEDI's reports are not 
detailed and consolidate financial date corresponding to very diverse projects. An opera-
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tional viability analysis is particularly difficult, because as both AID's Microenterprise Stock 
Taking and Alicia Pfund report, there is significant subsidization across APEDI's programs. 
To assess such subsidization would require an extensive on-site analysis of the activities of 
PROAPE, APEDI, and FONDESA, in order to appraise the necessary expenses for each 
of their activities and the subsidization across them. For example, it is not possible to 
exactly determine the amount of the credit portfolio generated by the program up to 1989 
from looking at APEDI's reports. This amount could be closely approximated by taking the 
46 percent (reported by FONDESA) of the total balance reflected in its financial statement 
of that year. That amount is 1.07 million pesos. 
D. Jeff Poyo's Evaluation 
For the AID Stock Taking exercise, Jeff Poyo arrived at the following conclusions 
about APEDI: 
A detailed analysis of the sustainability of the PROAPE/FONDESA program is not 
possible, because their operations are consolidated with other divisions within APED!. 
However, from APEDI's consolidated balance sheets, it is evident that a significant degree 
of external subsidization is required. Comparative balance sheets show that yearly opera-
tional losses were of the order of 108,181 pesos for 1985, 154,457 for 1986, and 100,566 for 
1987. 
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According to a budget for fiscal year 1988, PROAPE received its income from three 
major sources: grants (56.9 percent), commission on loans through FONDESA and FIDE11 
(38.1 percent), other sources (3.1 percent), and user charges for training courses (1.9 
percent). It is interesting to note that its major service, its courses, represents the least 
important source of revenues. 
If the loan request is above 2,400 pesos, the application is channelled to the formal 
banking system for refinancing by the Investment Fund for Economic Development (FIDE). 
If, however, it is below this benchmark, the application goes to FONDESA. PROAPE 
receives a three percent commission on the loans which are channelled through the formal 
banking system, using FIDE funds, in payment for the preparation of a feasibility study. In 
addition, if there is a need for further technical assistance, a contract is signed with the 
client, and PRO APE receives an additional two percent per year on the outstanding balance 
of the loan. If the loan is channelled through FONDESA, PRO APE receives a one percent 
commission for the preparation of the study and two percent, in addition, if technical 
assistance is required as a loan condition. It normally receives the two percent surcharge. 
As of November, 1985 FONDESA was legally separated from APED I. However, the 
analysis of its sustainability is made difficult by the lack of sufficient financial information. 
The balance sheet shows that the loan portfolio grew from 424,180 pesos in December 1986 
to 570,407 in June 1988. In constant 1980 pesos, the portfolio grew by 8.3 percent in 18 
months. 
11 The Investment Fund for Economic Development is located at the Central Bank. 
It disburses rediscounting and donor lines of credit for development projects. 
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FONDESA had been charging its borrowers 12 percent annual average interest, 
which was then raised to 24 percent and to 39 percent even more recently. Given a monthly 
inflation of 3 calculated above, the real rate of interest is -1.15 percent per month. Based 
on calculations from the balance sheets and income statements, FONDESA received interest 
income which represented 12.6 percent and incurred operating costs which represented 8.8 
percent of its portfolio in 1987. These figures seriously underestimate its real operational 
costs, since advisors from PROAPE serve as loan officers for FONDESA. 
Any profitability analysis of each of the different departments within APEDI would 
require a detailed cost study, to ascertain the distribution of operational expenditures. 
However, given profits of approximately 5,824 pesos over an 18-month period, it is clear that 
if the costs had been adequately allocated between divisions, FONDESA would have had 
an operational loss. The negative rates of interest charged by APED! will lead to the 
decapitalization of its net worth. 
PROAPE/FONDESA's structure is more complex. The program lacks clear 
institutional objectives, and is inhibited by the institutional structure of APED I. Less fluidity 
exists in the structure, and the fungibility of funds between divisions means that it is more 
difficult to hold the divisions separately accountable for their activities. 
PROAPE/FONDESA is constrained by the social welfare orientation of APED!, its 
sponsor, which is in conflict with its business development thrust. Further, its efficiency is 
undermined by its dependence on FIDE, which has been slow and inefficient. The lack of 
autonomy and lack of clarity of project goals has handicapped PROAPE/FONDESA. 
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The diffused and conflicting goals, different clienteles, and lack of strategic thinking 
about comparative advantage have inhibited PROAPE/FONDESA in achieving self-
sustainability, and perhaps improved beneficiary impact as well. 

